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SHAFFER v. HEITNER:
A DEATH WARRANT FOR THE TRANSIENT RULE OF
IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION?
DANIEL

0.

BERNSTINEf

I. INTRODUCTION

OF PROCESS ON AN INDIVIDUAL while he is physically present in the forum has long been deemed a sufficient basis
for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.1 This rule, denominated
by one commentator the "transient rule" of personal jurisdiction, 2 is
based on a territorial conception of judicial power (territorial power
theory) that a state has authority over all persons and property within
its borders. 3 The transient rule has become so firmly entrenched in
SERVICE
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third-year student at Howard University School of Law, for their research and assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 28 (1971). Section 28 of the Restatement provides that "[a] state has power to
exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is present within its territory, whether
permanently or temporarily." Id.
2. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction:The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 289 (1956).
3. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720
(1877). The Pennoyer Court enunciated this territorial power theory in the following passage:
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of
the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them, One of these principles is,that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine
for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants .... The other principle of public
law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory .... The several
States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is
allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond
that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.
Id. at 722 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied by the Court). The latter principle stated by
the Court, that no state can exercise jurisdiction over persons outside its territory, was
supplanted by the minimum contacts analysis introduced in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a discussion of International Shoe, see notes 12-25 and
accompanying text infra. This article queries the status of the former principle, that a State has
exclusive jurisdiction over persons within its boundaries.
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American law that no lawyer has, as yet, been successful
in risking
4
his client's money in a frontal assault upon the rule.
Traditionally, presence of property within the boundaries of a
state, no matter how temporary, was also considered to be a sufficient
foundation for a state's exercise of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. 5 In the landmark case of Shaffer v. Heitner,6 however, the
United States Supreme Court altered the concept that the presence
of property within the forum is a sufficient jurisdictional basis for in
7
rem and quasi in rem actions.
Although the Court's decision in Shaffer specifically discussed
only the due process limitations on the exercise of in rem and quasi
in rem jurisdiction,' subsequent state and lower federal court decisions have relied, in part, on Shaffer to determine whether they
could fairly exercise in personam jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. 9 This article will consider whether the standards applied in
Forty years after Pennoyer, the McDonald case reflected the settled territorial theory of judicial power. The Court stated that "[tihe foundation of jurisdiction is physical power," and added
somewhat prophetically: "No doubt there may be some extension of the means of acquiring
jurisdiction beyond service or appearance [within the forum], but the foundation should be
borne in mind." 243 U.S. at 91. For a discussion of how these means of acquiring jurisdiction
were indeed extended, see notes 12-35 and accompanying text infra.
4. See Schlesinger, Methods of Progress in Conflict of Laws: Some Comments on
Ehrenzweig's Treatment of "Transient" Jurisdiction, 9 J. PUB. L. 313, 316 (1960). Only three
reported cases have been discovered involving a direct challenge to the transient rule based on
the minimum contacts approach of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
and in all three cases the challenge failed. See Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419 (1st
Cir. 1976); Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 119 N.W.2d 737 (1963); Oxmans' Erwin Meat
Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979). For a discussion of International
Shoe, see notes 12-25 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Davis and Nielsen, see
note 37 infra. For a discussion of Blacketer, see notes 141-49 and accompanying text infra.
5. See, e.g., Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 60 (1971). For a discussion of actions in rem and in personam,
see Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws, 31 COLUM. L. REV.
368 (1931). For a discussion of jurisdiction in rem, see Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits
Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241 (1939); Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In
Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARv. L. REV. 107 (1913).
6. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
7. See id. at 205-06.
8. See id. at 196-98.
9. See, e.g., Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Marshall County Hosp., 586 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1978);
Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978); Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d
833 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fehr Bros. v. Acciaierie Weissenfels, 439 U.S. 983 (1978);
Toro Co. v. Ballas Liquidating Co., 572 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1978); Empire Abrasive Equip. Co.
v. H.H. Watson, Inc., 567 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1977); Bethany Auto Sales, Inc. v. Aptco Auto
Auction, Inc., 564 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1977); Schoeneck v. Passante, Civ. No. 77-2160 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 18, 1977); Humid-Aire Corp. v. Levitt, Inc., [1978] 1 Trade Cas.
61,846 (N.D. Ill.
1977); Miller Brewing Co. v. Acme Process Equip. Co., 441 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Wis. 1977);
Pavlo v. James, 437 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Merkel Assoc., Inc. v. Bellofram Corp.,
437 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 72 II1. 2d 548, 382 N.E.2d
252 (1978); Glading v. Furman, 282 Md. 200, 383 A.2d 398 (1978); Droukas v. Divers Training
Academy, Inc., 376 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1978); Town of Haverhill v. City Bank & Trust Co., 402
A.2d 185 (N.H. 1979); Moon Carrier v. Reliance Ins. Co., 153 N.J. Super. 312, 379 A.2d 517
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Shaffer to in rem and quasi in rem actions must now be extended to
in personam jurisdiction based on the transient rule, so that an individual's temporary physical presence in the state will no longer be a
sufficient basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction. This discussion
will also examine the post-Shaffer decisions to determine whether a
trend exists towards abolition of the transient rule.
A. Territorial Power Theory: Some Background
The classic case of Pennoyer v. Neff 10 sets out two traditional
jurisdictional principles: first, every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory;
and second, no state can exercise direct jurisdiction over persons or
property outside its boundaries. 1 '
The force of the latter principle has been drastically diminished
by the minimum contacts standard established by InternationalShoe
Co. v. Washington 12 and its progeny. 13 In International Shoe, a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in St. Louis,
was engaged in the manufacture and sale of shoes and other footwear. 1 4 Although the corporation manufactured its products in several states and distributed them interstate, it had no place of business
in the state of Washington. 15 The corporation did employ residents
of 'Washington as salesmen, but the salesmen merely displayed samples and solicited orders for the corporation 1 6 without entering into
17
contracts or making collections.
Washington had set up an unemployment compensation plan,
the cost of which was defrayed by mandatory contributions from
employers to a state unemployment compensation fund.'
When the
corporation failed to make these contributions, a notice of assessment
was personally served on one of the corporation's Washington sales
agents. 19 The corporation contested service on the grounds that it

(Law Div. 1977). For further discussion of the exercise of personal jurisdiction beyond the
borders of the forum, see text accompanying notes 12-35 infra.
10. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
11. Id. at 722. See note 3 supra.
12. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957); notes 26-35 and accompanying text infra.
14. 326 U.S. at 313.
15. Id.

16. Id. at 313-14. The authority of the salesmen was limited to these activities. Id. at 314.
17. Id. at 314.
18. Id. at 311-12.
19. Id. at 312.
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was not a Washington corporation and was not doing business within
20
that state.
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that "presence
within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was [historically] prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding" a defendant. 2 l Nevertheless, the Court declared that a defendant need no
longer be physically present within the forum state, since due process
requires only that the defendant have sufficient contacts with the
forum so that maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." 22 The Court noted that
the corporation's activities in Washington were neither irregular nor
casual and, in fact, resulted in a large volume of interstate business. 23 Moreover, the corporation was receiving the benefits and
protection of the laws of Washington. 2 4 The Court held that these
contacts with the forum were sufficient to permit the state to exercise
25
in personam jurisdiction over the corporation.
Several years later in McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co.,a26 the Court again addressed the question of whether jurisdiction
could be asserted over a corporation not present within the forum
state. In McGee, the plaintiff filed suit in California to recover on an
insurance contract against a company which had never had an office
or an agent in California. 2 7 Indeed, except for the single policy in
question, the company had done no business in California whatsoever.2 8 Nonetheless, the Court found a "substantial connection"
between the contract of insurance and the forum state for the following reasons: 1) the solicitation to reinsure had been mailed to the
insured in California; 2) the contract was delivered there; 3) the premiums were mailed from that state; and 4) the insured was a resident

20. Id.

21. Id. at 316, citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
22. 326 U.S. at 316. The Court stated that no quantitative test was possible; rather, whether
due process was satisfied must depend "upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure." Id. at 319. The Court suggested two extremes where sufficient minimum
contacts might be found: 1) where "the continuous corporate operations within a state [are]
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against [a defendant] on causes of
action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities"; and 2) where "the commission of some single or occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state .. . . because of their
nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to
render the corporation liable to suit." Id. at 31& (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 320.
24. Id.

25. Id.
26. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).

27. Id. at 221-22.
28. Id. at 222.
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of California when he died. 29 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged
that California had an interest in providing its residents with effective
means of redress. 30 Thus, the Court held that the California court's
31
assertion of jurisdiction did not violate due process.
In Hanson v. Denckla,3 2 however, the Court limited the expanding reach of the minimum contacts analysis by holding that minimum
contacts cannot be found to exist unless "there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and pro33
tection of its laws."
In short, as a result of this series of cases, the minimum contacts
rule has come to require a sufficient relationship between the defendant, the litigation, and the forum state, before that state's exercise of
jurisdiction will be found constitutional. Territorial boundaries are no
longer the foremost consideration when the defendant is outside of
the forum. The philosophy of International Shoe and its progeny has
been widely effected through state long-arm statutes; 4 these stat29. Id. at 223. The Court conceded that it might be inconvenient for this defendant to
defend itself in California but added that such inconvenience did not amount to a denial of due
process. Id. at 224.
30. Id. at 223.
31. Id. One court has suggested that in personam jurisdication over an outside defendant as
upheld in McGee may no longer be valid under Shaffer. See Smith v. Lloyd's of London, 568
F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1978). The Smith court noted that, as a result of Shaffer, "the liberal
construction placed on the words 'traditional notions of fair play' in a due process context may
be evolving into a more conservative one, requiring perhaps even more contacts than those
present in McGee." Id. at 1118 n.7. See also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In
Kulko, the Supreme Court held that, in an action for child support, the exercise by a state court
of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident, nondomiciliary parent, whose minor children are
domiciled within that state, violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
86.
32. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
33. Id. at 253, citing international Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (emphasis added). In Hanson, a settlor, while a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, had established a trust
in Delaware with a Delaware trustee. 357 U.S. at 328. The settlor later became domiciled in
Florida, where she died. Id. at 238-39. In an action regarding the trust assets after the settlor's
death, the Florida court had found that service by mail upon the Delaware trustee was sufficient to give it in personam jurisdiction because adequate minimum contacts existed between
the State of Florida and the trustee. Id. at 241-43. Holding that the Florida court did not have
jurisdiction over the trustee, the United States Supreme Court distinguished McGee by noting
the following factors: 1) unlike the insurance policy in McGee, the trust in Hanson had no
relation to the forum state at the time it was executed; and 2) the "bits of trust administration"
carried on by the settlor after she became domiciled in Florida did not bear upon the validity of
the trust agreement, whereas in McGee, the insurance policy would not have existed but for the
solicitation to reinsure which the insurance company had sent to the insured in California. Id. at
251-52.
34. Long-arm statutes vary in their manner of permitting jurisdiction over defendants outside the state. New York, for example, permits its courts to exercise jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary where the cause of action arises out of any of four enumerated and defined classes of
acts. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 302(a) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1978-1979). In contrast, California's long-arm statute simply provides that "[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction of
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utes, together with state nonresident motorist laws, 3 5 have allowed
state courts to go beyond their borders to exercise in personam jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.
Prior to Shaffer, the International Shoe minimum contacts standard had not been applied to support or defeat in personam jurisdiction in cases where the defendant was physically present within the
state; 36 indeed, its application in such cases had twice been rejected. 3 7 Thus, a plaintiff could sue a defendant personally in any
any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 410.01 (West 1973).
For examples of how such different statutes are implemented, compare Cornelison v.
Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976) (broad statute) with Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (specific
statute).
35. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1978-1979); 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6701 (Purdon 1977). The validity of nonresident motorist statutes was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). This decision, which
preceded International Shoe by over 18 years, was not based on a minimum contacts analysis;
instead, the Court held that a state could validly invoke its police power to declare that "use of
the highway by the non-resident is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent
on whom process may be served." Id. at 356-57.
36. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). It is important to note
how the InternationalShoe Court formulated its rule:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 316, citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) (emphasis added). See also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. at 222. The statement arguably assumes that where the defendant
is present, no minimum contacts will be required. See Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 483,
119 N.W.2d 737, 738 (1963).
Since Shaffer, the minimum contacts standard has been explicitly applied to defeat in personam jurisdiction based on corporate presence. See Schreiber v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 448 F.
Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978) (alternative holding). See also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v.
Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978) (dictum). But see Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co.
v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979) (dictum) (suggesting that the minimum
contacts requirement does not apply to a natural person served within the forum state). For a
discussion of these cases, see notes 113-49 and accompanying text infra.
37. See Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1976); Nielsen v. Braland, 264
Minn. 481, 119 N.W.2d 737 (1963). In Davis, the defendant, who was a citizen and resident of
Vermont, had formed a partnership with another citizen and resident of Vermont. 543 F.2d at
419. The partnership entered into a contract with the plaintiff, a New Hampshire corporation.
Id. The contract was to be performed in Vermont, but performance was never completed. Id.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire
and service was made on the defendant while he was in New Hampshire on business unrelated
to the partnership. Id. Citing Hanson and InternationalShoe, the defendant moved to dismiss,
claiming that "mere presence within the jurisdiction [was] not enough to subject him to the
court's process." Id. at 420. The First Circuit rejected the defendant's argument, stating that
this reliance on cases such as International Shoe was misplaced since those cases dealt with
"expanding jurisdiction beyond traditional limits, not with contracting it." Id. The court declined to overturn what it described as "black letter law that personal service within its geographical area established a court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Id.
In Nielsen, the defendant, a resident of Iowa, was involved in a traffic accident in Iowa
with the plaintiff, a resident of Minnesota. 264 Minn. at 482, 119 N.W.2d at 738. While the
defendant was in Minnesota performing his job (defendant was a meter-reader in a village lo-
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state where the defendant was physically present.3 8 In fact, the
transient rule of jurisdiction has so permeated judicial reasoning that
it has rarely been challenged. This is illustrated by the paucity of
cases, both before and after International Shoe, contesting in personam jurisdiction based solely on the defendant's physical presence
within the territorial boundaries of the forum. 39 It seems that the
only cases testing this principle are those which raise the novel factual situations so ideally suited for hypothetical problems in Civil
Procedure and Jurisdiction courses.
In the early case of Peabody v. Hamilton,4 0 for example, a Massachusetts court asserted in personam jurisdiction over a New York
resident in a suit brought against him by a citizen and resident of
England on a cause of action arising outside of Massachusetts. 4 ' The
defendant was served with process while on board a steamer docked
in Boston harbor. 42 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
upheld the validity of the service, declaring that "[w]hen the party is
in the state, however transiently, and the summons is actually served
upon him there, the jurisdiction of the court is complete, as to the
person of the defendant." 4 3 The territorial power theory has also
been upheld where the defendant was served while on vacation in
the forum state, 44 while in the forum state for a few hours on busi-

cated partly in Iowa and partly in Minnesota), he was served with a summons. Id. The defendant's argument paralleled the one later made by the defendant in Davis. The Minnesota court
also found that InternationalShoe was inapposite, holding that a minimum contacts analysis is
not proper when the defendant was served while physically present in the forum. Id.at 483, 119
N.W.2d at 738.
38. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S at 316; note 36 supra; notes 1-4 and
accompanying text supra. Exceptions to this rule exist, however, when the defendant is present
in the state solely to defend or appear as a witness in another suit, see Lamb v. Schmitt, 285
U.S. 222, 225, 227-28 (1932); Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 129 (1916); Cooper v. Wyman,
122 N.C. 784, 785, 29 S.E. 947, 947 (1898), or where the defendant is fraudulently induced to
enter the jurisdiction. See Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 1937). Immunity
also exists in certain circumstances for some diplomatic officers and their servants. 22 U.S.C.
§ 252-254,
39. See
40. 106
101 (1942);

288(d) (1976).
cases discussed notes 40-47 and accompanying text infra.
Mass. 217 (1870). See also Louisville & N.R.R. v. Meredith, 194 Ga. 106, 21 S.E.2d
Alley v. Caspar, 80 Me. 234, 14 A. 12 (1888); Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354

(1819).
41. 106 Mass. at 217-18, 220.
42. Id. at 222.
43. Id. at 220.
44. Fitzhugh v. Reid, 252 F. 234 (E.D. Ark. 1918). In Fitzhugh, a Colorado resident was
sued in an Arkansas state court by a California resident on a cause of action arising out of a
contract made and executed in Colorado. Id. at 238-39. The Colorado resident was served with
process while vacationing at Hot Springs. Id. at 235. Upon removal to a federal court, the
Colorado resident contended, inter alia,that on these facts the service constituted an abuse of
process for the following reasons: 1) the witnesses for both parties resided in Colorado, California, and Wyoming, and none were residents of Arkansas; and 2) all the written evidence was in
Colorado. Id. at 239. The district court nevertheless upheld the service, stating:
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ness, 45 while on board a commercial airplane flying over the forum
state, 46 and while just passing through the forum in travelling to an
47
adjoining state.
In sum, prior to Shaffer, in personam jurisdiction could be had
over a defendant not present in the forum so long as the defendant
had sufficient contacts with that state. On the other hand, when the
defendant was present in the forum state, in personam jurisdiction
was properly based on the territorial power theory of Pennoyer, without considering whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with
the forum.
B. The Shaffer Decision
In Shaffer, a nonresident shareholder filed a shareholder's derivative suit in a county court of chancery in Delaware. 48 The suit was
filed against twenty-eight present and former corporate officers and
directors of Greyhound, a Delaware corporation, based on corporate
action in Oregon. 49 Pursuant to a Delaware statute, 50 plaintiff simultaneously filed a motion for sequestration of the nonresident defendants' shares, options, warrants and corporate rights which were pres[A] party has, ordinarily, the right to institute and maintain an action against a defendant
in any court of competent jurisdiction where personal service can be had on him,
whereby the court obtains jurisdiction of his person. The fact that it may be inconvenient
for the defendant to make his defense in that tribunal . . . is no cause for abatement of
the action, or quashing the service of the summons.
id.
45. Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 A. 714 (1895); Darrah v. Watson, 36
Iowa 116 (1872). In Fisher, a Connecticut resident, while in England on business, was served
with process from an English court. 67 Conn. at 104, 34 A. at 714. The Connecticut court,
called upon by the English plaintiff to execute upon the default judgment rendered in the
English action, held that the service was valid under the transient rule. Id. at 105-06, 34 A. at
715.
In Darrah, a Pennsylvania resident was served while he was on business for two or three
hours in Virginia. 36 Iowa at 119. The Iowa court, executing on the judgment of the Virginia
court, upheld service under the transient rule. Id. at 120-21. See also cases discussed note 37
supra.
46. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). In Grace, citizens of Arkansas
brought an action against, inter alios, a citizen of Illinois upon a cause of action arising out of a
contract made and executed in Illinois. Id. at 443, 447. The Illinois citizen was served in an
airplane when the plane passed over Arkansas en route from Memphis, Tennessee, to Dallas,
Texas. Id. at 443. The court held that such service constituted service within the territorial
limits of Arkansas, and declined to grant the Illinois citizen's motion to quash service on the
ground that he was never within the forum state. Id. at 447-48.
47. Lee v. Baird, 139 Ala. 526, 36 So. 720 (1903). In Lee, Alabama citizens served a citizen
of Mississippi while he was driving from Mississippi to North Carolina. Id. at 527, 36 So. at
720. The cause of action did not arise in Alabama. Id. The court nevertheless held that the
service was valid. Id. at 529, 36 So. at 720.
48. 433 U.S. at 189.
49. Id. at 189-90.
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1975). In response to the Shaffer decision, Delaware has
amended its sequestration statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1978).
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ent in Delaware. 51 Defendants entered a special appearance for the
purpose of moving to quash service of process and to vacate the ex
parte sequestration order, 52 contending that the sequestration procedure did not accord them due process and that their contacts with
Delaware were insufficient to sustain the court's exercise of jurisdic53
tion under the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe.
The trial court rejected these arguments 54 and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding that since jurisdiction was quasi in
55
rem, International Shoe was inapplicable.
On appeal, Justice Marshall, writing for the United States Supreme Court, noted that the lower court's "cursory treatment" of the
applicability of minimum contacts was based on an erroneous assumption that Pennoyer was still the appropriate standard for in rem jurisdiction. 5 6 Reversing the state-court decision, the Court held that International Shoe and its progeny should now be used to determine
the propriety of asserting in rem jurisdiction as well as in personam
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. 5 7 Justice Marshall stated
this holding, however, with tantalizing breadth:
The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the prop51. 433 U.S. at 190-92. For purposes of attachment, Delaware law provided that Delaware
was the situs of stock in a Delaware corporation, even though none of the stock certificates
seized was physically present in Delaware. Id. at 192 & n.9; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 69
(1975). The stocks were seized by placing "stop transfer" orders on the books of Greyhound. 433
U.S. at 192.
52. 433 U.S. at 192-93. Generally, if a defendant "appears in response to a summons and
makes no objection to his being brought before the court," then he is "deemed to have submitted to the authority of the court and consented to its exercise of jurisdiction." F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.22, at 647 (2d ed. 1977). In this situation, the defendant will
be deemed to have made a "general appearance." Id. To challenge the jurisdiction of the court,
the defendant may elect to refuse to appear at all, permit a default judgment to be entered
against him, and then raise the jurisdictional challenge by collateral attack when the plaintiff
brings an action to enforce the judgment. Id. In so doing, however, the defendant runs the risk
of losing on the jurisdictional issue in the enforcement proceeding, and thereby becoming subject to the default judgment without having had any opportunity to contest the action on its
merits. Id. As "[a]n escape from this dilemma," the entry of a special appearance at the outset
of the plaintiff's original action permits "the presentation, at the threshold of the proceedings, of
the contention that the court lacks jurisdiction over the person making the objection." Id. For
further discusson of the "special appearance," see id. § 12.22, at 645-49.
53. 433 U.S. at 192-93. In support of their contention that the sequestration procedure
violated due process requirements, the defendants relied upon Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); and Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969). 433 U.S. at 193. The Delaware Supreme Court found that the issues raised in
the Sniadach line of cases were inapplicable to the sequestration procedure involved in Shaffer.
Id. at 194. The United States Supreme Court did not reach this contention, since it decided for
the defendants on their jurisdictional arguments. See notes 56-58 and accompanying text infra.
54. 433 U.S. at 193-94.
55. Id. at 194-95.
56. Id. at 195-96.
57. Id. at 212.
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erty supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification. Its continued acceptance would serve only to allow state-court
jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.
We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny. 58

II.

THE IMPACT OF SHAFFER ON THE TRANSIENT RULE OF

IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION: AN UNANSWERED

QUESTION

At the time of this writing, two years after the Court's decision
in Shaffer, and after a plethora of legal commentary has been written, 5 9 the scope of Justice Marshall's opinion has yet to be determined. Although several commentators have suggested that transient
presence is no longer a valid basis for the assertion of in personam
jurisdiction after Shaffer, 60 only two lower federal courts have been
willing to take such a strong position against the continued validity of
transient presence as a jurisdictional basis. 6 1 Indeed, a few cases
58. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
59. See, e.g., Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26
KAN. L. REV. 61 (1977); Fischer, "Minimum Contacts": Shaffer's Unified Jurisdictional Test, 12
VAL. L. REv. 25 (1977); Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1977),
Leathers, Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 66 KY. L.J. 1 (1977);
Olsen, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Survey of its Effects on Washington Jurisdiction, 13 GONZ. L.
REV. 72 (1977); Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Interstate Accident Cases:
The Implications of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 329, Vernon, Single-Factor Bases
of In Personam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH.
U.L.Q. 273 [hereinafter cited as Single-Factor Bases]; Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A PreliminaryInquiry into the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA. L. REV. 997 (1978);
Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15 (1978); Note, Shaffer
v. Heitner: The Conceptual and Practical Effects, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 183 (1978); Comment,
Quasi in Rem on the Heels of Shaffer v. Heitner: If International Shoe Fits ....
46 FORDHAM
L. REV. 459 (1978); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: New Constitutional Questions Concerning Seider
v. Roth, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393 (1978) [hereinafter cited as New Constitutional Questions];
Note, New Standards for the Use of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 24 Loy. L. REv. 171 (1978);
Note, "Minimum Contacts" Concept of In Personam Jurisdiction Extended to Domestic Relations Litigation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 341 (1977); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: A New Attitude
Toward State CourtJurisdiction, 13 TULSA L.J. 82 (1977); Note, A States Assertion of Jurisdiction over a Nonresident Defendant Based Solely on the Statutory Presence of the Defendant's
Property Within the State Violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, 46
U. CINN. L. REV. 1063 (1977); Note, The Application of Minimum Contacts Analysis to All
Assertions of State Court Jurisdiction-Shaffer v. Heitner, 9 U. TOL. L. REv. 333 (1978); Note,
Jurisdiction-A Methodological Analysis: Implications for Presence and Domicile as Jurisdictional Bases-Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 WASH. L. REV. 537 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Presence
and Domicile].
60. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 59, at 162 n.62; Single-Factor Bases, supra note 59, at
302-05; Zammit, supra note 59, at 20-23; Presence and Domicile, supra note 59, at 550 & n.64.
61. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978)
(dictum); Schreiber v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978) (alternative
holding). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 113-37 and accompanying text infra.
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have stated in dicta that transient presence continues to be a valid
62
basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
The disagreement among these later cases may be due in part to
the differences found in the separate opinions filed by the Justices in
Shaffer. Two concurring members of the Court, Justices Powell and
Stevens, were concerned that Justice Marshall's opinion might be
read too broadly. 6 3 Justice Stevens stated his fear that other wellaccepted methods of acquiring jurisdiction over persons who have
adequate notice of the suit might be invalidated. 64 Justice Powell
expressly reserved judgment on whether certain types of property,
especially real property, provide the contacts necessary to subject a
defendant to jurisdiction. 6 5 Justice Brennan, while agreeing that
minimum contacts is the appropriate standard to apply to in rem and
quasi in rem actions, disagreed with Justice Marshall's analysis of the
66
contacts involved under the facts of Shaffer.
A. Impact on the Rule of Seider v. Roth
The uncertainty regarding the reach of the Shaffer decision is
reflected in the confusion surrounding its effect on the doctrine of
Seider v. Roth. 67 In Seider, the Court of Appeals of New York held
that a New York plaintiff, injured in an automobile collision in Vermont, could obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by attaching a debt
situated in New York and owed to the Canadian defendant. 68 The
debt attached by the plaintiff was the obligation owed to the defendant by his New York insurer under an automobile collision insurance
policy. 69 This manner of asserting quasi in rem jurisdiction, although
71
often criticized, 70 was followed in subsequent cases.
62. See, e.g., Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 & n.25 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 1016 (1979) (dictum); Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 687-89, 273

N.W.2d 285, 286-87 (1979) (dictum). For a discussion of Blacketer, see notes 141-49 and accompanying text infra.
63. See 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 217-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring). According to Justice Stevens, the principal evil in
the Delaware scheme was that purchasers on the national securities market would not be aware
of the peculiarities of Delaware law which, unlike the law in the 49 other states, made Delaware the situs of all stock in a Delaware corporation. Id. See note 51 supra.
65. 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 222-28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
68. Id. at 112, 114-15, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100, 102.
69. Id. at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
70. See, e.g., Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or Putting Seider Back Into Its
Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 660 (1971); Stein, Jurisdictionby Attachment of Liability Insurance,
43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075 (1968). For a list of other commentaries criticizing Seider, see
Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
71. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969); Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973), overruled in Rocca v. Kenney,
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The Seider doctrine has its roots in the 1905 case of Harris v.
Balk, 72 where the United States Supreme Court held that a person
could proceed on a claim against a nonresident by garnishing a debt
owed to the nonresident by a third person. 73 Because the situs of a
debt moves with the debtor, 74 jurisdiction over the debt could be
achieved by serving the debtor within the forum, even though he was
75
only transitorily present in the jurisdiction.
The Shaffer decision appears to have sounded the deathknell for
those cases in which the presence of the property was the sole basis
for asserting jurisdiction. The Court strongly implied that cases such
as Harris should no longer be followed:
It appears, therefore, that jurisdiction over many types of actions which now are or might be brought in rem would not be
affected by a holding that any assertion of state-court jurisdiction
must satisfy the InternationalShoe standard. For the type of quasi
in rem action typified by Harris v. Balk and the present case,
however, accepting the proposed anaysis would result in significant
change. These are cases where the property which now serves as
the basis for state-court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the
plaintiff's cause of action. Thus, although the presence of the defendant's property in a State might suggest the existence of other
ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support the State's jurisdiction. If those other ties did not exist, cases over which the State is
now thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in that
forum.

76

Indeed, the post-Shaffer cases reveal that the lower courts are
no longer willing to sustain jurisdiction based solely on the attachment of a debt or other property located in a forum state which is
otherwise unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action. 77 At the same
381 A.2d 330 (N.H. 1977); Savchuk v. Rush, 245 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1976), vacated, 433 U.S.
902 (1977). For discussion of the treatment of the Seider doctrine after Shaffer, see notes 79-97
and accompanying text infra.
72. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
73. Id. at 226.
74. Id. at 222-23.
75. Id. at 224-26. The United States Supreme Court has also upheld the seizure of an
absent husband's bank account as sufficient to enforce his obligation to pay alimony. See Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917).
76. 433 U.S. at 208-09 (footnote omitted). The Court refused, however, to explicitly define
the extent to which its decision in Shaffer overruled prior cases. Id. at 212 n.39.
77. See, e.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978);
Mississippi Chem. Corp. v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
In admiralty cases the courts have continued to sustain personal jurisdiction under admiralty rule B(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based solely upon the presence of
property within the forum. See Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de
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time, there is still quite a bit of disagreement among the courts78 and
commentators as to whether or not Seider was overruled by the
Court's decision in Shaffer. 79 Some courts have suggested that the
Supreme Court in Shaffer did, in effect, overrule Seider. 80 One
court, for example, reasoned that since Seider attachments of insurance obligations have their roots in Harris,8 1 and since Shaffer held
that an assertion of jurisdiction like that in Harris is now subject to
scrutiny under the minimum contacts test, 82 an attachment under
83
Seider would similarly be insufficient to establish jurisdiction.
In O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 84 however, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an assertion of jurisdiction
under Seider does not violate the principles of Shaffer, at least where
the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state. 85 The court first distinguished the attachment of an insurance policy from that of an ordinary debt as in Harris.86 Noting that it was the insurance company
Navigation, 459 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian
Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978); Engineering Equip. Co. v. S.S.
Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B(1). These cases do not
affect the present discussion, however, because they have been distinguished from Shaffer on
both constutitional and analytical grounds: "[t]he recognized autonomy of admiralty jurisprudence, although not absolute, and the long constitutional viability of maritime attachment compel . .. [the conclusion] that Shaffer does iot reach Rule B(1) attachment." Grand Bahama
Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. at 455 (footnotes omitted).
For further discussion, see Bohman, Applicability of Shaffer to Admiralty in Rem Jurisdiction,
53 TUL. L. REv. 135 (1978).
78. See cases discussed notes 80-97 and accompanying text infra.
79. See, e.g., Leathers, Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 66
KY. L. REv. 1 (1978) (predicting that the Seider doctrine will survive Shaffer); Note, Quasi in
Rem Jurisdiction: The Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth after Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 409 (1978) (also predicting that the Seider doctrine will survive Shaffer); Note, New
Standardsfor the Use of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 24 Loy. L. REv. 171, 180 (1978) (predicting the demise of Seider).
80. See, e.g., Andrade v. Central Contracting Co., No. 76-5140 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1978);
Torres v. Towmotor Div. of Caterpillar, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 460, 471-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1977);
Belcher v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978); Rocca v.
Kenney, 381 A.2d 330 (N.H. 1977) (overruling Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129
(1973)).
81. Torres v. Towmotor Div. of Caterpillar, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 460, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
82. Id. at 469, citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 208-09.
83. 457 F. Supp. at 474. The Torres court also considered whether the existence of a contract of insurance with an insurer in the forum state might itself provide the necessary minimum
contacts, but concluded that it did not. Id. at 472-74.
84. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
85. 579 F.2d at 199-200. In so holding, the court relied heavily on the opinion of the district
court. See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579
F.2d 194 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
86. 579 F.2d at 198-99. The court noted that the obligation attached in Harris could have
been applied by the creditor to purposes other than payment of the claim under which it was
attached. Id. at 199. The court distinguished Seider from Harris on the ground that the "utility
[of the obligations under the insurance policy] is . . . to protect [the defendant] from liability
and in an appropriate case to allow the plaintiff to recover from the insurer .... " The defendant in Seider could not "recover, sell or hypothecate" this obligation; thus a judgment for the
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which, in fact, would conduct the defense as obligated under the policy, the court analyzed the fairness of the Seider doctrine by focusing
on the impact of its application on the insurer. 87 The court concluded that where the insurer is doing business in the forum state,
the Seider-type procedure does not violate due process because the
insurer has no justifiable ground for complaint about the forum's
exercise of jurisdiction over it. 88 The New York Court of Appeals
subsequently cited O'Connor with approval in a per curiam decision
which again upheld the Seider rule. 89
Whether the United States Supreme Court would apply Shaffer
to assertions of jurisdiction under Seider remains a speculative
area of the law of jurisdiction, and the disagreement among the lower
courts highlights the need for a definitive pronouncement on the subject. Shortly after its decision in Shaffer, the Court vacated a Minnesota Supreme Court judgment which had permitted jurisdiction
based on a Seider attachment, and remanded the case for a determination in light of Shaffer. 90 This action, however, was interpreted by
the Second Circuit to be "[a]t most ....
an affirmation of the Court's
declared unwillingness to determine at that time the extent to which
jurisdictional doctrines other than those before it in Shaffer were affected by the decision." 9 '
The Supreme Court recently declined to grant certiorari in
O'Connor and, thus, refused to determine the extent to which Seider
and other jurisdictional doctrines were affected by Shaffer. 92 Justice
Powell dissented from this denial, and indicated his position in an
opinion in which he was joined by Justice Blackmun. 93 In his displaintiff would not "deprive a defendant of anything substantial that would have been otherwise
useful to him." Id. at 199 (footnote and citation omitted).
87. Id. at 200-02. The court also briefly examined whether there was any unfairness to the
"nominal" defendant, the insured, but again found no constitutional violation. Id. at 201-02.
88. Id. at 200-01. The court pointed out that "[d]oing business within the state continues to
be a recognized basis for the existence of in personam jurisdiction, over a corporation." Id. at
201.
89. See Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 891, 383 N.E.2d 110, 111, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810
(1978) (per curiam).
90. See Rush v. Savchuk, 433 U.S. 902 (1977) (mem.) (vacating Savchuk v. Rush, 245
N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1976)). On remand, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court again upheld
the assertion of jurisdiction under the Seider doctrine, distinguishing Shaffer on the same
grounds relied upon in O'Connor. See Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), prob.
juris. noted, 440 U.S. 905 (1979); note 97 infra. For a discussion of O'Connor, see notes 84-89
and accompanying text supra; notes 91-96 and accompanying text infra.
91. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d at 199 n.6, citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. at 208 n.30, 219 n.39.
92. See Lee-Hy Paving Corp. v. O'Connor, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978). But see Savchuk v. Rush,
272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), prob. juris. noted, 440 U.S. 905 (1979); note 90 and accompanying text supra; note 97 infra. A second appeal of Savchuk has been docketed and oral argument
set. 440 U.S. 905 (1979). Thus, the Court may have no choice but to decide the issue.
93. Id. at 1034-38 (Powell, J., dissenting).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss1/5

14

Bernstine: Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of in
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 25: p. 38

sent, Justice Powell objected to the finding of the court of appeals
that there was no unfairness in subjecting the insurance company and
the insured defendant to the jurisdiction of the courts under the
Seider doctrine. 94 After detailing the hardships which he thought
the Seider doctrine imposed upon defendants, 9 5 Justice Powell concluded that "the judicially created Seider doctrine raises serious questions of due process" and "does not appear consonant with the standards of fairness enunciated in [International Shoe] and strongly
96
reiterated in [Shaffer]."
The fate of' Seider-type jurisdiction cannot be adequately predicted. It is clear, however, that since the Supreme Court's decision
in Shaffer was announced, lower courts which have considered an
assertion of jurisdiction under Seider have examined the contacts in97
volved under the facts of each case much more closely.
B. Impact on the Transient Rule
Shaffer held that physical power over property is no longer a
sufficient basis for exercising jurisdiction; rather, what is required is a
94. Id. at 1036-37 (Powell, J.,dissenting).
95. Id. at 1037-38 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell found that the Seider doctrine was
unfair to the insurers in the following respects: 1) judge and jury may be unable to view the
scene of the accident; and 2) "Ulurors drawn from the venue of the accident may be better able
to understand testimony pertaining to local conditions and geography." Id. at 1037 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). In addition, Justice Powell found unfairness to the insured defendant since the
assertion of jurisdiction by a remote forum could require that he travel long distances and be
away for long periods of time. Id.
96. Id. at 1038 (Powell, J.,dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Powell also noted his unwillingness to view the Seider doctrine as a judicially created direct action statute. Id. at 103536 (Powell, J., dissenting). A direct action statute permits an injured plaintiff to bring suit
directly against the insurer of the tortfeasor, and such a procedure has been held constitutional.
See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 67-68, 72-73 (1954). For a
discussion of the difference between jurisdiction under Seider and jurisdiction under a direct
action statute, see Comment, supra note 59, at 483-87. For commentary viewing jurisdiction
under Seider as similar to jurisdiction under direct action statutes, see Note, The Constitutionalityof Seider v. Roth after Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 409, 413-17 (1978).
97. See, e.g., Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), prob. Jurtis. noted, 440 U.S.
905 (1979). On remand from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of
Shaffer, see Rush v. Savchuk, 433 U.S. 902 (1977) (mem.), the Savchuk court upheld the validity of jurisdiction under the Seider rule, basing its holding on the following grounds: 1) the
attachment procedure could only be used against claims directly involved in the underlying
action; 2) Minnesota has a legitimate interest in facilitating recoveries for resident plaintiffs; and
3) the "practical relationship" of the insurer to the nominal defendant usually results in the
insurer conducting the defense anyway. 272 N.W.2d at 891-93. In concluding its analysis, the
court stated:
We view as relevant the relationship between the defending parties, the litigation,
and the forum state. It cannot be said that Minnesota lacks such minimally-requisite "contacts, ties or relations" to those defending parties as to offend the requirements of due
process. In view of our consistent policies of providing a forum to residents of this state
and extending our jurisdiction to the maximum limits consistent with due process, we
decline to reverse our prior decision.
Id. at 893.
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nexus between the defendant, the controversy, and the forum. 98 By
rejecting the idea that a state may exercise jurisdiction over property
solely on the basis of its presence within the state, Shaffer cuts sharply
into the first principle of Pennoyer-that every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction over property within its borders-and potentially
abolishes the traditional distinctions between in personam, in rem,
and quasi in rem jurisdiction in favor of the minimum contacts approach. 99
In rem jurisdiction has generally been distinguishable from in
personam jurisdiction in that a judgment rendered by a court with in
rem jurisdiction does not bind the defendant personally; rather, it
determines the rights of all persons to the property subject to the
court's jurisdiction. 10 0 Quasi in rem jurisdiction generally determines the rights of particular persons to the property or applies a
defendant's property to the satisfaction of a claim against him.' 0 '
Shaffer, however, strongly implies that there is no distinction between any of the forms of jurisdiction, because, in the Court's view,
the assertion of jurisdiction over property is nothing more than an
10 2
assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property.
Long before Shaffer, Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court of
California criticized the distinctions between the various forms of
jurisdiction:
It is time we had done with mechanical distinctions between
in rem and in personam, high time now in a mobile society where

property increasingly becomes intangible and the fictional res becomes stranger and stranger. Insofar as courts remain given to asking "Res, res-who's got the res?," they cripple their evaluation of

the real factors that should determine jurisdiction. They cannot
evaluate the real factors squarely until they give up the ghost of
the res. As they do so, the gap will narrow between the tests of

10 3
jurisdiction and the tests of forum non conveniens.

The Court in Shaffer similarly reasoned that because in rem and
quasi in rem cases result in the adjudication of personal rights, the
98. 433 U.S. at 209.
99. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 720; notes 3 & 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
100. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958).
101. Id.
102. 433 U.S. at 207-09.
103. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REv. 657, 663 (1959). In this
article, Justice Traynor was commenting upon his opinion in Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49
Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957). In Atkinson, the California Supreme Court applied the
minimum contacts standard to an assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction in order to obtain jurisdiction over all interested parties in an action challenging the validity of a trust fund. Id. at
340-41, 345-47, 316 P.2d at 961-62, 964-66.
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minimum contacts standard is therefore applicable. 10 4 The broad
language of the Court that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny" 105 arguably mandates that the same
standards should be applied to an assertion of state-court jurisdiction
under the transient rule.' 0 6 International Shoe clearly requires
minimum contacts analysis where the defendant is not present in the
forum; 107 and Shaffer now clearly requires minimum contacts
analysis in most, if not all, in rem and quasi in rem actions regardless
of whether the property is present in the state. 10 8
As the debate over the Seider doctrine' 0 9 suggests, however, the
scope of the Shaffer decision with respect to the transient rule remains uncertain. If Shaffer is read broadly, the transient rule, like
Harris and possibly Seider, may already be dead. 110 On the other
hand, if Shaffer is limited to in rem and quasi in rem cases, Pennoyer
may still have some life where jurisdiction is based solely on a defendant's presence in the state and where his presence has no nexus
with the plaintiff, the litigation, or the forum-as would be required
by the minimum contacts approach."' The post-Shaffer cases have
yet to formally announce the demise of the transient rule by declaring
invalid the assertion of personal jurisdiction based solely on the presence of the defendant in the forum state. 1 12 Two recent federal district court decisions, however, illustrate that the doctrine may be enjoying its final days of vitality.
In Schreiber v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 113 a Kansas resident
brought a products liability action in Mississippi against a Delaware
corporation having its principal place of business in Wisconsin based
on an accident which occurred in Kansas. 1 14 Apparently because the
104. 433 U.S. at 207-09, 211-12.
105. Id. at 212 (footnote omitted).
106. See notes 150-62 and accompanying text infra.
107. See 326 U.S. at 316. For a discussion of InternationalShoe, see notes 12-25 and accompanying text supra.
108. See 433 U.S. at 212; notes 48-58 and accompanying text supra. Later decisions have
stated Shaffer's holding to be that "quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to adjudicate is subject to the same
due process limitations as is in personam jurisdiction." DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895,
898 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978). See also Inland Credit Corp. v. M/T Bow
Egret, 556 F.2d 756, 757 (5th Cir. 1977).
109. See notes 67-97 and accompanying text supra.
110. See notes 150-81 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of cases which have so
concluded, see notes 113-37 and accompanying text infra.
111. For a discussion of Pennoyer, see notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the minimum contacts approach, see notes 12-35 and accompanying text supra.
112. See Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979)
(stating that the transient rule had not been overruled by Shaffer). For a discussion of Blacketer, see notes 141-49 and accompanying text infra.
113. 448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978).
114. Id. at 1081.
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claim would have been barred by the Kansas statute of limitations,1 15
the plaintiff chose to file suit in Mississippi which had a longer limitations period. 1 16 Personal jurisdiction over the defendant was obtained on the theory that the corporation was "present" in the jurisdiction since it was licensed by the state to do business there, 1 17 even
though the business it conducted in Mississippi was unrelated to its
manufacture of farm machinery, the source of the plaintiff's claim. 118
The defendant successfully argued that for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses, 1 19 the action should be transferred to the district court in Kansas because there was no connection between Mississippi and the cause of action or any party thereto. 120 The defendant acknowledged that the effect of the transfer was that the case
would be heard by a district court in Kansas, sitting as a district court
1 21
in Mississippi, applying Mississippi law.
Once the suit had been moved to the District of Kansas, however, the defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the Mississippi
court.' 2 2 The gravamen of the defendant's charge was that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the Kansas statute of limitations. 123 The
defendant argued that, although the transferee court must generally
apply the statute of limitations which would have been applied had
there been no transfer, where the transferor court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, the transferee court must apply the
statute of limitations of the transferee forum.' 2 4 In other words, if
Mississippi could not have asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant, it could not have applied its statute of limitations to the
plaintiff's claim. Alternatively, the defendant contended that even if
jurisdiction could have been properly assumed by Mississippi, that

115. Id. The claim would have been barred by the applicable statutes of limitations had the
action been brought in Kansas-the district in which the claim arose-and in any venue or
residence other than Mississippi. Id.
116. Id. The action was filed in Mississippi six days before the six-year Mississippi statute of
limitations governing tort and warranty actions would have run. Id.
117. Id. Mississippi law provides for service upon any corporation found doing business in
Mississippi, "whether the cause of action accrued in this state or not." Id. See MIss. CODE
ANN. §§ 79-1-27, 29 (1972).
118. 448 F. Supp. at 1085.
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
120. 448 F. Supp. at 1081-82. The court found that Mississippi had no particular interest in
providing a forum to adjudicate the claim of a Kansas resident because 1) none of the evidence
or witnesses was connected with Mississippi; 2) Mississippi had no regulatory interest in the
corporate defendant's activities; and 3) the cause of action did not arise out of the defendant's
activities in Mississippi. Id. at 1090-91.
121. Id. at 1082.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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state, under its conflict of laws principles, would have applied the
shorter Kansas statute of limitations and, thus, would have dismissed
25
the action. 1
The Schreiber court seemed to accept the plaintiff's argument
that the corporation was "present" in the jurisdiction for purposes of
service. 126 Even so, the court stated that "[t]here can be no question that a 'power' theory of jurisdiction, relying on outmoded notions
of 'presence' and 'consent,' has no place in a discussion of power to
effect personal jurisdiction over a non-resident individual who did not
act and caused no injury within the forum state." 127 Applying the
standards of International Shoe, therefore, the court held that "a Mississippi court could not assume jurisdiction of this case in accordance
with due process." 128 In so holding, the Schreiber court stated:
After Shaffer, plaintiff cannot rely solely on the asserted fact of
"presence" to sustain an exercise of jurisdiction in Mississippi, for
"physical presence is no longer either necessary or sufficient for in
personam actions." . . . Rather, the nature and quality of that

"presence" must be evaluated, with an eye toward the interest of
Mississippi in assuming jurisdiction and providing a forum for this
29
particular action. 1
The Schreiber court further declared that Shaffer requires that "any
assumption of jurisdiction must meet the 'contacts' test of International Shoe, and . . . that obsolete exceptions to this test (such as
'corporate presence') which may have survived International Shoe
should [not] be preserved."130
Although Schreiber concerned corporate presence, the language
employed by the court indicates that it might have been equally willing to find that transient presence was no longer a sufficient basis for
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over individuals. 13 1 However, several facts concerning Schreiber caution against extending the
case beyond its facts.
The court's opinion represents a premature and imperfect
obituary for the transient rule of personal jurisdiction for several
reasons: 1) as indicated, the case involved corporate rather than indi125. Id.
126. Id. at 1086, citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-213 (1972) (subjecting foreign corporations

licensed to do business in Mississippi to the same "duties, restrictions, penalties and liabilities"
as domestic corporations).
127. 448 F. Supp. at 1087 (dictum) (emphasis supplied by the court).
128. Id. at 1090-91 (alternative holding).
129. Id. at 1089, quoting Casad, supra note 59, at 77 (emphasis supplied by the court).
130. 448 F. Supp. at 1089.
131. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
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vidual presence; 2) after holding that the Mississippi court could not
assert jurisdiction over the case without violating due process rights,
the court went on to consider the defendant's alternative conflict of
laws argument-an action which undermines the court's assertion
that its jurisdictional holding "commands dismissal of the case in accordance with [the] defendant's motion"; 132 and 3) there are indications that the court was perturbed with the plaintiff's attorney for
engaging in the evils of forum-shopping on other occasions and,
therefore, may have subconsciously or unintentionally imposed more
133
stringent jurisdictional standards on this plaintiff.
A subsequent case, Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil
Co., 134 cited Schreiber as authority for the proposition that Shaffer's
rejection of the territorial power theory of state-court jurisdiction indicates that presence within the forum is no longer a sufficient basis
to support the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.' 3 5 Thus, the
Energy Reserves court stated, "[w]hether established by 'doing business,' 'express or implied consent,' or by physical fact, presence is
• .. neither necessary nor always sufficient as a basis to support the
exercise of jurisdiction." 136
Schreiber and Energy Reserves appear to be the only two cases
to date which have indicated that presence within the forum may no
longer be a sufficient basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.' 3 7 It should be noted that the Shaffer opinion indicated that
132. Id. at 1091. With regard to the defendant's choice of law argument, see text accompanying note 125 supra. The court held that, at least in this case, a Mississippi court would apply
the Kansas statute of limitations rather than its own. 448 F. Supp. at 1101. Thus, even if
jurisdiction would have been proper in Mississippi, the plaintiff would not have escaped the
effect of the Kansas statute. Id.
133. Id. at 1082. The court stated: "We must preface our analysis ...with a frank admission
of our antipathy for plaintiff's position. . . . [W]e are cognizant that plaintiff's counsel has
employed similar arguments, and has succeeded in resurrecting a claim 'stale' in Kansas, in at
least one other case . . . . Id.

134. 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978). In Energy Reserves, the plaintiff corporation, with its
principal place of business in Kansas, brought an action on a contract against two corporations: a
Nevada corporation doing business in Kansas, and its Nevada subsidiary which did not do business in Kansas. Id. at 491. After an extensive review of case law and authorities, the court
applied the standards of International Shoe to uphold the assertion of in personam jurisdiction
over the nonresident subsidiary. Id. at 515.
135. Id. at 504.
136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. Numerous post-Shaffer cases have stated that corporate presence may serve as a basis
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant, but only if two conditions are met: 1)
the corporate defendant has some contact with the forum by an act which actually transpired in
the forum state; and 2) the corporation has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum. See, e.g., Marketing & Distribution Resources, Inc. v. Paccar, Inc.,
460 F. Supp. 990 (D. Mass. 1978); Western Desert, Inc. v. Chase Resources Corp., 460 F.
Supp. 63 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Darden v. Heck's, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Va. 1978);
Metropa Co. v. Choi, 458 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v.
D'Angelo, 453 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); A.A. Importing Co. v. Karavias U.S.A. Inc., No.
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corporations, by their nature, may be subject to jurisdiction in cases
where individuals are not. 13 8 Nevertheless, the contention in
Schreiber and Energy Reserves that courts should apply the minimum
contacts analysis even when a corporation is present in the forum to
determine if in personam jurisdiction exists would seem to support
the imposition of the identical requirement on an individual who is
present in the forum state.1 39 Arguably, these cases suggest that the
demise of the transient rule is the next logical step in the development of a jurisdictional theory which is consistent with due process. 140
Nonetheless, in the only post-Shaffer case which presented the
opportunity to decide on the merits whether an individual is still subject to the transient rule, the court declined to overturn this "solidly
established" basis of jurisdiction. 14 1 In that case, Oxmans' Erwin
Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 1 4 2 the plaintiff, a Wisconsin corporation,
sought to recover the amount of a debt allegedly owed to it by the
defendant Oklahoma corporation and by an individual defendant, an
agent of the corporation. 143 The plaintiff served the individual defendant, who was not a resident of Wisconsin, while he was physically
present in that state. 144 The defendant agent challenged the court's
76-2430 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1978); Droukas v. Divers Training Academy, 376 N.E.2d 548 (Mass.
1978); U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977).
138. 433 U.S. at 204 n.19.
139. One court, however, has suggested in' dictum that anyone found within a particular
forum would have sufficient contacts with that forum to meet the minimum contacts standard
anyway. See Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 & n.25 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
1016 (1979) (dictum); cf. notes 152-54 and accompanying text infra. But see notes 179-80 and
accompanying text infra.
140. One commentator has observed:
The [Shaffer] decision proves beyond question that old jurisdictional dogma is not
sacred. If century-old law on in rem jurisdiction can be changed, so can other rules that
are believed to operate unfairly. Professor Ehrenzweig long urged that personal jurisdiction based on service on a defendant who was only temporarily within the state ought not
to be allowed.
R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTs LAw § 24A, at 43 (3d ed. 1977). See Ehrenzweig, supra

note 2.
141. Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979), quoting
Foster, Expanding JurisdictionOver Nonresidents, 32 Wis. B. BULL. Oct. 1959 (Supp.), at 11.
142. 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979).
143. Id. at 688, 273 N.W.2d at 286. The debt arose when the plaintiff agreed to supply meat
on credit to six restaurants, two of which were in Wisconsin. Id. at 689, 273 N.W.2d at 288.
The plaintiff alleged that the individual defendant had misrepresented himself to be a general
partner in the restaurants and, therefore, should be personally liable for the amount of the
debt. Id. at 689-90, 273 N.W.2d at 288. In fact, the individual defendant was merely acting as
agent for the defendant corporation, which was the true general partner of the restaurants. Id.
at 690, 273 N.W.2d at 288. Hence, the plaintiff sought to recover for the individual defendant's
fraudulent misrepresentation that he was personally liable as a partner. Id. at 692-93, 273
N.W.2d at 289-90.
144. Id. at 686, 273 N.W.2d at 286. Although the individual defendant's place of residence
was not indicated, it is implicit in the opinion that he was not a resident or domiciliary of
Wisconsin. Id. at 689-92, 273 N.W.2d at 287-89.
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jurisdiction on the ground that his mere physical presence was no
longer sufficient to permit personal jurisdiction; rather, he maintained, the individual must also have certain minimum contacts with
145
the forum state.
After noting that "[p]hysical presence is the traditional basis of
judicial jurisdiction," 146 the Blacketer court stated:
In our view the United States Supreme Court has not imposed
a "minimum contacts" requirement on a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a natural person upon whom personal service within
the state has been achieved. Neither International Shoe nor its
progeny, including the recent case of Shaffer v. Heitner ....
addresses the issue of the constitutionality of the state's exercising
jurisdiction based solely on the service of process upon an indi147
vidual within state borders.
Nevertheless, the court found that the facts of the case did not require a holding on this issue since, even if the minimum contacts
approach were applicable to an assertion of jurisdiction based on
physical presence, the defendant agent's activities in Wisconsin "fulfilled the 'minimum contacts' requirements." 148 Therefore, the Blacketer court concluded that it was "reasonable, just and consistent with
traditional notions of fair play" to subject the individual defendant to
suit in Wisconsin.149

145. Id. at 687, 273 N.W.2d at 287, citing International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. at
316.
146. 86 Wis. 2d at 687, 273 N.W.2d at 286.
147. Id. at 687-88, 273 N.W.2d at 287 (footnote and citation omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the Blacketer court cited Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1976) and
Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 119 N.W.2d 737 (1963). See 86 Wis. 2d at 687 n.3, 273
N.W.2d at 287 n.3. Both of these pre-Shaffer cases involved attacks on the transient rule based
on InternationalShoe which were rejected by the respective courts. See 543 F.2d at 420; 264
Minn. at 483, 119 N.W.2d at 738. For a discussion of Davis and Nielsen, see note 37 supra.
The Blacketer court also quoted extensively from a comment on Shaffer which appears in a
tentative draft of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS. See 86 Wis. 2d at 688 n.4, 273
N.W.2d at 287 n.4. This comment states:
In light of [Shaffer], it may well be doubted whether . . . defendant's "presence in the
state, even for an instant, gives the state judicial jurisdiction over him," in the absence of
some connection between the state and the transaction or the parties involved in the
litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner seems to undercut that proposition, but the effect on territorial jurisdiction is modest. Given the doctrine of forum non conveniens, few if any states
would exercise jurisdiction in such circumstances .... As a theoretical matter, however,
the effect of Shaffer v. Heitner is considerable. It would establish "minimum contacts" in
place of presence as the principal basis for territorial jurisdiction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 8, Comment a, at 63-64 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978),
quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28, Comment a (1971), quoted in 86
Wis. 2d 688 n.4, 273 N.W. 2d 287 n.4. (citations omitted).
148. 86 Wis. 2d at 688, 273 N.W.2d at 287.
149. Id. at 693, 273 N.W.2d at 289. The Blacketer court relied on the facts found by the trial
court to demonstrate the presence of sufficient contacts, which included the following: 1) the
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In sum, although the Blacketer court insisted that the transient
rule of in personam jurisdiction survives Shaffer, it apparently felt
compelled to fully analyze the defendant's contacts with the state and
to demonstrate that the state's assertion of personal jurisdiction over
this defendant satisfied both standards. As a result, the Blacketer decision only adds to the confusion surrounding the transient rule after
Shaffer.
III.

THE DEMISE OF THE TRANSIENT RULE OF IN PERSONAM
JURISDICTION: THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP?

In the past when personal mobility was limited, causes of action
usually arose between persons residing in the same state; thus, the
transient rule of in personam jurisdiction was considered to be fair
since normally the defendant was not put in the harsh position of
having to defend an action in a place with which he had no contacts
other than his mere presence. 150 Today, by contrast, the enormous
amount of interstate activity makes it more likely that cases will arise
in which the forum state has little or no connection with the litigation
other than the defendant's fortuitous physical presence in the state at
the time of service.' 5 '
Typically, however, the defendant's presence will coincide with
other factors which might form a nexus sufficient to support jurisdiction. 152 For example, the forum may also be the plaintiffs place of
residence or domicile; witnesses or evidence may be located in the
forum; or the events which gave rise to the cause of action may have

individual defendant started doing business with the plaintiff in order to supply a new
restaurant being opened in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 2) 44 of 50 business meetings between the
parties were held in the individual defendant's offices in Milwaukee; and 3) the cause of action
arose out of a meeting held in Milwaukee at which the individual defendant allegedly misrepresented that he would be personally liable on the debt as a general partner. Id. at 689-90, 273
N.W.2d at 288.
150. See Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 938
(1960).
151. See id. Another commentator has stated that "the mere presence of the defendant ... is
probably insufficient to support jurisdiction over claims unrelated to his activities within the
forum." Karst, supra note 59, at 160.
152. See note 139 supra. One commenator suggests that
[t]he consequences of Shaffer, in subjecting the Pennoyer categories to the International
Shoe rule, may be more doctrinal than practical. Although the mere presence of the
defendant, like the mere presence of his property, is probably insufficient to support
jurisdiction over claims unrelated to his activities within the forum, the presence of either
the defendant's person or his property will often signal other relationships with the forum
and the controversy that are adequate to support jurisdiction. Further, a defendant who is
domiciled or who resides within the forum is likely to have an extensive network of
contacts sufficient to support jurisdiction over any claim asserted against him.
Karst, supra note 59, at 160 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
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occurred in the forum. 153 If, on the other hand, the defendant's
presence is not joined with factors such as these, the question becomes whether, in light of Shaffer's apparent abolition of the jurisdictional distinctions,' 5 4 a defendant should be forced to defend in a
completely unrelated forum simply because service was made there.
With the advent of the long-arm and nonresident motorists statutes, 155 and with physical presence no longer a prerequisite to the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction, there is little need for the
"catch-as-catch-can" 156 attitude which justifies the transient rule. 15 7
More importantly, the standards of International Shoe and its prog158
eny, when read in conjunction with Shaffer and subsequent cases,
do not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant
1 59
whose only connection with the forum is physical presence.
A critical distinction between jurisdiction based on long-arm and
nonresident motorist statutes versus jurisdiction based solely on presence is that with respect to the statutory bases, there exists some
relationship between the litigation and the forum. 160 Under the
transient rule, however, where a defendant's mere presence is the
basis of jurisdiction, the forum may otherwise have no connection
with the cause of action. 16 1 If the mere physical presence of prop153. See Von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate" A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. 1Ev. 1121, 1134 (1966).
154. See text accompanying notes 102 & 105-06 supra; notes 126-31 & 134-49 and accompanying text supra.
155. For a discussion of long-arm and nonresident motorist statutes, see notes 34 & 35 supra.
156. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 306.
157. See id. at 306-12.
158. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483, 504 (D. Kan.
1978) (dictum); Schreiber v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1090-91 (D. Kan. 1978)
(alternative holding).
159. For a discussion of the impact of Shaffer, see notes 59-149 and accompanying text supra.
Other traditional bases of jurisdiction may be targeted for challenge as well. In Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), the Supreme Court upheld domicile as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over a person who was not present within the forum when served, reasoning that the
defendant, as a domiciliary, enjoyed the incidences of residence and the protection of the state's
laws. Id. at 463-64. It may be difficult to reconcile cases such as Milliken with the pronouncement of Shaffer. In actions in rem, the owner of the property presumably enjoys theprotection
of his property under the laws of the state in which the property is located, yet Shaffer apparently now requires that the minumum contacts standard be applied in such cases. See notes
45-55 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, it can be argued that if it is unfair for a state to
assert jurisdiction over one who is only transiently present in the forum state, it is similarly
unfair to allow the assertion of jurisdiction in the state where the defendant is merely
domiciled. As one commentator has noted, jurisdiction based solely upon technical domicile is
as offensive to traditional notions of due process as is transient presence since "the reciprocal
rights and duties associated with domicile are unrelated to the domicile's interest in the outcome of the litigation, the convenience of that state as a place to litigate, or the likelihood that a
defendant would anticipate being sued there." Single-Factor Bases, supra note 59, at 301 (footnote omitted).
160. For a discussion of long-arm and nonresident motorist statutes, see notes 34 & 35 supra.
161. See note 151 and accompanying text supra.
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erty is now insufficient to establish jurisdiction in actions in rem, 16 2
then mere physical presence of the individual should be equally suspect, unless there is also some nexus between the presence and the
pending litigation as required by the minimum contacts approach.
Nonetheless, it has been argued that the transient rule of in personam jurisdiction should be maintained for three reasons: 1) it is a
predictable rule upon which parties can rely; 163 2) as Justice Stevens
suggests in Shaffer, being served with process is a justifiable risk that
people assume upon entering a state; 164 and 3) as mentioned previously, 16 5 the exercise of jurisdiction in most cases will comply with
the due process requirements of International Shoe anyway, since a
defendant will normally have had some other contacts with the
forum.
While predictability is a laudable objective, it must necessarily
give way in the face of potential violations of due process rights. As
already suggested in this article, it is reasonable to argue that the
transient rule is unfair to defendants in light of the holdings of International Shoe and Shaffer. 166 The rule's unfairness should not be
tolerated because of considerations such as predictability.
With respect to the "justifiable risk" argument, 16 7 Justice Stevens maintained that the Court's decision in Shaffer should not be
used to invalidate accepted jurisdictional principles, particularly when
the defendant has adequate notice that a particular activity may subject him to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, in addition to actual notice of the litigation. 168 In his concurring opinion in Shaffer,
Justite Stevens listed some voluntary acts, including transient presence, which he apparently believes continue to represent sufficient
bases for asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant. 169 Justice
Stevens reasoned that by consciously performing one of the acts
listed, the defendant should have been placed on notice of the possibility of his having to defend a suit in the forum. 170 Thus, Justice
162. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
163. See Presence and Domicile, supra note 59, at 554. In reserving'judgment on whether
ownership of property located within the forum should permit state-court jurisdiction in certain
in rem actions, Justice Powell similarly argued in Shaffer that a rule permitting jurisdiction in
such cases "would avoid the uncertainty of the general International Shoe standard." 433 U.S.
at 217 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
164. 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).
165. See note 139 supra; notes 152-53 and accompanying text supra.
166. See notes 150-62 and accompanying text supra.
167. See text accompanying note 164 supra.
168. 433 U.S. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).

169. See id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring). For a list of the other acts which Justice Stevens
considers to be sufficient contacts to permit the exercise of in personam jurisdiction, see text
accompanying note 171 infra.
170. 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Stevens apparently intended to indicate that transient presence continues to provide a valid basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction, for he stated: "If I visit another State, or acquire real estate or
open a bank account in it, I knowingly assume some risk that the
State will exercise its power over my property or my person while
there. My contact with the State, though minimal, gives rise to predictable risks." 171
In two later cases, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York cited this passage as support for holding that a nonresident
defendant's maintenance of a bank account in the forum state established sufficient contacts to justify the court's assertion of quasi in rem
jurisdiction. 1 72 The court reasoned that the nonresident defendant's
conscious placement of property in the forum state should have put
him on notice that he might later have to defend a claim involving
that property in the foreign jurisdiction. 1 73 These cases have been
criticized for failing to enforce the requirement set forth by the
majority in Shaffer that there be a relationship between the property
attached and the underlying cause of action. 17 4 Nevertheless, it is
possible that courts in the future could use reasoning similar to the
rationale of these two cases to sustain transient presence as an
adequate basis for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction. In short,
relying upon Justice Stevens' concurrence, a court could find that
transient presence represents a conscious act that puts the defendant
on notice of the possibility of his having to defend suit in the state he
is visiting should he be served with a complaint while transiently
within that state.
There is no doubt that service on a defendant who is physically
17 5
present in the forum is sufficient notice under any standard.
Nevertheless, while notice has always been a critical element in determining fundamental fairness, it should not be dispositive. Actual
notice, without more, has not been a basis for sustaining the assertion
of state-court jurisdiction. 1 76 Thus, even though a transient defendant may have sufficient notice, jurisdiction based solely on such
171. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
172. See Lime Int'l Corp. v. Bank in Liechtenstein Aktiengesellschaft, No. 77-5499-CSH
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1978); Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
173. Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273, 1278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
174. See Note, If the (International)Shoe Fits . . . Subsequent Interpretation of Shaffer v.
Heitner, 10 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 175, 193-95 (1978).
175. The relationship between notice and due process was defined by the Supreme Court in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In that case, the Court
noted that a fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding is that notice be
reasonably calculated to reach all interested parties. Id. at 314.
176. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 241 (1958); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 309 (1950).
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notice without the existence of other factors would still be insufficient. 177 Presence has heretofore been the other factor triggering
transient jurisdiction.' 17 If the factor of presence is held to be no
longer sufficient in light of the fundamental fairness requirement,
then the fact of actual notice to the defendant should not be substituted as a bootstrap to jurisdiction.
Finally, while it may be true that, normally, minimum contacts
will exist when a defendant is present within the forum,' 79 the fact
that more often than not -a correct result will be reached under the
transient rule cannot justify the process by which that result is
achieved. This is particularly true today, since methods for reaching
the proper result are now available which were not available when
the territorial power theory was announced. 180 The minimum contacts analysis of International Shoe, implemented by state long-arm
statutes, is presently a sufficient means for assuring jurisdiction in
those cases where the defendant's transient presence is tied to other
contacts with the forum state. Moreover, in cases where it appears
that the plaintiff has no other forum available, jurisdiction would
probably be upheld, even after Shaffer, under an exception to the
minimum contacts rule. 18 '
In sum, of the three arguments offered to support the continued
viability of the transient rule of in personam jurisdiction, 18 2 none has
proven to be compelling. As the following discussion will indicate,

177. See cases cited note 176 supra.
178. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 721-23.
179. See note 139 supra; notes 152-53 and accompanying text supra.
180. The territorial power theory was announced in 1877 in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at
722. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
181. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 309-12. The Shaffer Court explicitly declined to consider the situation in which the only available forum is the forum where the property is located.
433 U.S. at 211 n.37. However, the Court's rejection of the procedure used in Shaffer included
a recitation of other methods available to plaintiffs to obtain jurisdiction in a manner consistent
with InternationalShoe. Id. at 202-05. It is submitted that if these other methods were unavailable so that no forum would be open to the plaintiffs unless jurisdiction could be predicated on
the presence of property within the state, a court could presumably distinguish Shaffer and
exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction. See Note, Power, Fundamental Fairness, and Jurisdiction:
Shaffer v. Heitner, 32 ARK. L. REv. 101, 119 (1978). In Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping
Co., 455 F. Supp. 630 (D. Conn. 1977), a federal district court used this rationale to uphold the
validity of an assertion of jurisdiction based upon the attachment of a debt unrelated to the
plaintiff's cause of action, where the foreign defendant could not be subjected to jurisdiction in
any other forum in the United States. Id. at 631, 633. While acknowledging that the defendant
did not have sufficient contacts with the forum, the court reasoned that by transacting business
with United States corporations, the foreign defendant had taken the risk that debts owed to it
by these corporations would be used as the basis for jurisdiction in a United States court. Id. at
633. For further discussion df the fairness of allowing suit in the only available forum, see
Single-Factor Bases, supra note 59.
182. See notes 163-65 and accompanying text supra.
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however, if the transient rule is not abrogated, cases where the defendant's presence is the only contact with the forum state will continue to produce troublesome results.
In Grace v. MacArthur,18 3 for example, it appears that the only
basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction over one of the defendants
was that he was served while flying over the state of Arkansas. 18 4 The
defendant's "presence" in Arkansas, though apparently unrelated to
the subject matter of the litigation, was deemed a sufficient basis to
deny his motion to quash service of process. 1 85 If the transient rule
were to be abolished, cases such as Grace would probably be resolved differently. The defendant's presence would not, ipso facto, have
given rise to potential personal liability unless there was, in addition,
some nexus between his presence in Arkansas and the pending litigation. Grace is precisely the type of factual situation which points out
the unfairness and absurdity of a blind application of the physical
power theory supporting the transient rule. The right of the individual to travel interstate should no longer carry with it any greater
risk of being sued in any jurisdiction crossed over in flight for events
occuring elsewhere, than the risk incurred by owners of property
which is located in another state.
Consider also the anomalous situation which may result if the
transient rule remains intact after Shaffer. In personam jurisdiction
might be regarded as the form of jurisdiction least protective of a
defendant in that it subjects all of the defendant's assets to a judgment secured by a plaintiff. An in rem judgment, on the other hand,
affords a defendant greater protection by limiting any judgment to the
86
value of the property which is subject to the court's jurisdiction.'
Shaffer makes it clear that mere presence of property is no longer a
sufficient basis to support the exercise of a court's power to decide a
controversy, absent minimum contacts. 1 8 7 Consequently, if Shaffer's
devaluation of presence in the jurisdictional equation does not eliminate the transient rule in actions in personam, a peculiar situation
would result: the more limited in rem actions would be evaluated by
the due process yardstick of minimum contacts, whereas the broader
and more generally used in personam actions would not be so tested
where the defendant was, for whatever reason, present in the state.
As one commentator has noted:
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959); see note 46 supra.
170 F. Supp. at 443.
Id. at 447-48.
See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of the holding of Shaffer, see notes 48-58 and accompanying text supra.
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The single factor of the defendant's transient presence in the
forum contributes nothing more than the presence of the defendant's property in the forum contributes to the existence of a forum
as a place to litigate, or a reason for defendant to anticipate suit
there. Because it is unfair to assert jurisdiction in Shaffer, it is

unfair to assert jurisdiction in the transient defendant case.1 88
Likewise, it would be somewhat odd that a nonresident defendant, whose property is located in the forum, would not be subject to
jurisdiction there because his property does not give rise to sufficient
minimum contacts, while another nonresident defendant, who owns
no property in the forum, does no business in the state, and does not
otherwise avail himself of the state's benefits and protection, will
nevertheless be subject to the court's jurisdiction merely because of
his transient presence. But if due process means fairness based on the
existence of minimum contacts between the defendant, the litigation,
and the forum, then it would appear that in personam jurisdiction,
grounded solely upon mere physical presence, is inconsistent with
the holding of Shaffer and should, therefore, be laid to rest. In future
cases, presence should be but one factor in determining whether a
court may exercise in personam jurisdiction.
Regardless of whether or not the transient rule survives Shaffer,

the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be used by courts to
avoid the aforementioned inequities. 18 9 The doctrine was, in fact,
initially formulated as a reaction to the transient rule of in personam
jurisdiction, and was designed to limit the plaintiffs choice of forum
without permitting the defendant to escape or minimize his obligations. 190

One commentator, who predicted the eventual demise of the
transient rule, further predicted that forum non conveniens would
then become a key consideration in such cases. 191 Another author,
Justice Traynor, also suggested that the abolition of the traditional
distinctions between in rem, quasi in rem, and in personam jurisdiction would correspondingly increase the importance of forum non
conveniens. 192 Forum non conveniens allows a court, within its discretion, to refuse to exercise existing jurisdiction when it believes
188. Single-Factor Bases, supra note 59, at 303.
189. "The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition
upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
190. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 301-02.
191. Id. at 310-14.
192. See Traynor, supra note 103, at 663-64. For a discussion of how Shaffer may have
lessened the distinctions between the traditional types of jurisdiction, see notes 98-149 and
accompanying text supra.
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that it would be inappropriate to do so. 193 Policy considerations of
fairness to litigants, similar to those taken into account in determining
jurisdiction under InternationalShoe and Shaffer, are also considered
when applying forum non conveniens. 194 One aspect of the fairness
requirement is to avoid the inconvenience of having to defend a suit
away from home. 19 5 Forum non conveniens could, therefore, be
employed as a fail-safe measure to protect a defendant from defending
in a forum when his only contact with it is his transient presence

there. 196
One factor favoring either the abolition of the transient rule, or
the court's use of forum non conveniens to decline to exercise its
jurisdiction, is that, if transient jurisdiction is exercised, choice-of-law
principles will frequently result in the application of another forum's
law:
With . . . [the distinctions between the tests of jurisdiction and the

tests of forum non conveniens] converging, we can expect them to
absorb choice-of-law tests. This is eminently sound, for the state
whose law controls is the one whose courts are best qualified to
interpret and apply it. There would be no better way of decreasing
choice-of-law problems and hence conflict than thus to channel the
197
litigation of transactions to that state.
193. See note 189 supra; note 194 infra.

194. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). As the Gulf Oil Court stated:
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be
appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility [sic] of a
judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair
trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex,"
"harrass," or "oppress" the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not
necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy.
Id. A few post-Shaffer cases have distinguished between the considerations of fairness applied
in the doctrine of forum non conveniens and those applied in the minimum contacts analysis.
See Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147,
156 n.25 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1016 (1979); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1,
8-10 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Fitzsimmons, for example, the court declined to include forum non
conveniens considerations in its determination of the constitutionality of an exercise of personal
jurisdiction under a federal statute providing for national service of process. See 589 F.2d at
334. The court reasoned that the central concern of Shaffer and its predecessors was the fairness of the exercise of power by a particular sovereign, rather than the fairness of imposing the
burdens of litigation in a particular forum. Id.
195. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 317.
196. It should be remembered, however, that a court's use of the forum non conveniens
doctrine is discretionary. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). If a court
refuses to declare itself an inconvenient forum, the defendant will be forced to defend the suit
with little recourse for challenging jurisdiction. Id. As the Gulf Oil Court stated, "unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed." Id.
197. Traynor, supra note 103, at 663-64.
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A forum which initially acquires jurisdiction under the transient rule
has little, if any, reason to apply its own substantive law to the litigation. Even those courts which have asserted jurisdiction over transients have recognized that such an assertion merely provides a
forum, and does not dictate the use of the forum's substantive law to
resolve the dispute. 19 When a forum exercises transient jurisdiction, the only circumstances which would favor using its laws would
be when the plaintiff is a resident of the forum and the litigation
involves an interest of the state in protecting its residents. In cases
where these circumstances are not present, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens is available to justify the forum's refusal to hear the case
since the state whose substantive law will govern the litigation is presumably best able to interpret and apply that law.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that since the policies behind
forum non conveniens and minimum contacts are substantially similar, 199 whether the forum is convenient may not be an issue in many
cases. The court, in making the initial determination of whether it
may hear the case, might determine that it lacks jurisdiction ab initio
due to the absence of minimum contacts and, as a result, would not
even have to reach the forum non conveniens issue. 20 0 Under the
fundamental fairness standard of International Shoe and Shaffer,2 0 l a
forum whose only contact with the suit is the physical presence of the
defendant should more appropriately rule that it has no jurisdiction,
instead of deciding that jurisdiction exists but that the forum is inconvenient.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The long accepted transient rule of in personam jurisdiction has
outlived its usefulness in light of modern methods of obtaining jurisdiction over defendants such as long-arm and nonresident motorist
statutes. Shaffer's pronouncement of new standards for quasi in rem
jurisdiction and the existing InternationalShoe standards which apply
to defendants not physically present in the state, also render continued application of the transient rule unfair and unnecessary. Although the post-Shaffer decisions have yet to formally declare an end
to transient in personam jurisdiction, a client's money might be well
spent in challenging the rule based on the broad holding of Shaffer.

198.
199.
200.
201.

See,
See
See
See

e.g.,
note
Gulf
note

Barnell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354, 356 (1819).
194 and accompanying text supra.
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
22 and accompanying text supra.
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